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INTRODUCTION: THE GLOBALIZATION OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION—COMPETITION OR COORDINATION? 
Barbara Black* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act1 in 2002 through 
2008, influential voices in the political, business, and academic 
communities expressed growing concern that the U.S. capital markets 
were losing their competitive advantage.2  While commentators 
identified a number of factors as contributing to this decline, they 
singled out, in particular, higher U.S. regulatory compliance costs and 
liability risks.  The U.S. Department of Treasury, under the leadership of 
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, spearheaded efforts to reexamine 
regulatory structure and emphasized the competitive pressures that 
foreign markets posed for the U.S. securities markets.3  The Treasury’s 
Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure, released in 
March 2008, warned that the “threat to U.S. competitiveness appears to 
be real and growing”4 and urged reforms “to protect the competitiveness 
of the U.S. public capital markets.”5 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in turn, considered 
a number of deregulatory proposals that would ease barriers to entry.  
Thus, in 2008, the agency eliminated the requirement that foreign 
private issuers selling securities in the U.S. restate their financial 
statements, prepared under International Financial Reporting Standards 
 *  Charles Hartsock Professor of Law and Director, Corporate Law Center, University of 
Cincinnati College of Law.  The Twenty Third Annual Symposium, Globalization of Securities Markets: 
Competition or Coordination?, was held on March 5, 2010.  This Introduction bears the date of October 
10, 2010. 
 1. 15 U.S.C. § 7201 et seq. (2006). 
 2. See, e.g., COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2007) (sponsored by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce); Kate Litvak, 
The Effect of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act on Non U.S. Companies Cross-Listed in the U.S., 13 J. CORP. FIN. 
196 (2007). 
 3. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REG., INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL 
MARKETS REGULATION 3–4 (2006) (the “Paulson Report”) (describing globalization of the capital 
markets as a significant development and noting that foreign capital markets, unlike the U.S., often 
benefit from more adaptive regulatory structures). 
 4. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
STRUCTURE 1 (2008). 
 5. Id. 
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(IFRS), to conform to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP).6  The SEC also released a Roadmap that set forth a process 
that would lead to the use of IFRS by domestic issuers in 2014.7  It 
launched a mutual recognition program that would exempt foreign stock 
exchanges and foreign broker–dealers from SEC registration so long as 
they complied with home-country regulations deemed compatible with 
U.S. regulation.8  The SEC also proposed a rule that would increase the 
range of services foreign broker–dealers could offer in the U.S. without 
registering with the agency.9  While the rationale for these actions was 
to increase market efficiency and liquidity and enhance investor 
protection,10 the SEC was likely influenced as well by the perception 
that the U.S. capital markets no longer possessed their previous 
dominance. 
The global financial meltdown of 2008, however, changed the tenor 
of the discussion and brought an increased awareness of the 
interconnectedness of the markets, the need for more effective regulation 
to deal with systemic risk, and the importance of a coordinated approach 
toward securities regulation.11  In contrast to the prior deregulatory 
approach, the Obama Administration’s Financial Regulatory Reform 
called for strengthening international cooperation to raise international 
regulatory standards.12  Its proposed reforms included improved 
 6. Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance 
with International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, Exchange Act 
Release No. 57,026, 73 Fed. Reg. 986 (Jan. 4, 2008).  These developments are analyzed in Steven M. 
Davidoff, Rhetoric and Reality: A Historical Perspective on the Regulation of Foreign Private Issuers, 
79 U. CIN. L. REV. 619 (2010). 
 7. Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 58,960, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 70,816 (Nov. 21, 2008).  These developments are analyzed in William W. Bratton, Heedless 
Globalism: The SEC’s Roadmap to Accounting Convergence, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 471 (2010). 
 8. See Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. 
Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31 (2007).  These developments are 
analyzed in Chris Brummer, Territoriality as a Regulatory Technique: Notes from the Financial Crisis, 
79 U. CIN. L. REV. 499 (2010). 
 9. Exemption of Certain Foreign Broker or Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 58,047, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 39,182 (July 8, 2008). 
 10. See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement of the European Commission and 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on Mutual Recognition in Securities Markets, (Feb. 1, 
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-9.htm (stating that mutual recognition 
“offers significant promise as a means of better protecting investors, fostering capital formation and 
maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient transatlantic securities markets”). 
 11. See, e.g., Timothy F. Geithner, Sec’y of Treasury, Remarks at the Brookings Institution (Oct. 
6, 2010) (describing the past two years as a “period of unprecedented international cooperation”). 
 12. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION: 
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 8 (2009) (noting that “[w]ithout consistent 
supervision and regulation, financial institutions will tend to move their activities to jurisdictions with 
looser standards, creating a race to the bottom and intensifying systemic risk for the entire global 
2
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oversight of the global financial markets and the global financial firms 
whose financial instability caused so much damage to the global 
economy.13 
International organizations also came forth with revitalized regulatory 
agendas that emphasized cooperation.  For example, the Financial 
Stability Forum, subsequently re-established as the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB),14 released principles for cross-border cooperation in crisis 
management in recognition that “the growing interactions between 
national financial systems require international cooperation by 
authorities.”15  The principles called for coordinated actions to prepare 
for financial crises, including the sharing of information and 
development of common support tools,16 and internationally coordinated 
solutions to manage financial crises.17  In response to the G-20 Leaders’ 
call for a review, the Joint Forum, established in 1996 under the aegis of 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Basel Committee), 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and 
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors to deal with 
issues common to the banking, securities, and insurance sectors, released 
a report that recommended improvements to strengthen financial 
regulation18 as part of a global effort to reform and strengthen financial 
regulation.19  The report emphasized the systemic risk posed by 
financial groups that operate “through networks of legal entities and 
structures” and that “are often active across multiple jurisdictions and 
with multiple interdependencies.”20  It also articulated as a guiding 
principle that “[c]onsistent implementation of international standards is 
critical to avoid competitive issues and regulatory arb 21
This Symposium was held on March 5, 2010, while policy makers 
and regulators were grappling with complex issues of reform and 
restructure in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  Congress was 
financial system”). 
 13. Id. at 16–18, 80–88. 
 14. The re-establishment of the Financial Stability Forum as the Financial Stability Board, which 
included expanding its membership, strengthening its institutional foundations, and enhancing its 
mandate, is set forth in Robert B. Ahdieh, Imperfect Alternatives: Networks, Salience, and Institutional 
Design in Financial Crisis, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 527 (2010). 
 15. FIN. STABILITY FORUM, FSF PRINCIPLES FOR CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION ON CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT 2 (2009). 
 16. Id. at 2–3. 
 17. Id. at 3–4. 
 18. THE JOINT FORUM, REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENTIATED NATURE AND SCOPE OF FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: KEY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2010). 
 19. Id. at 1. 
 20. Id. at 3. 
 21. Id. at 4. 
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debating the legislation that it subsequently enacted as the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank),22 and 
the Basel Committee had released a proposal to strengthen global capital 
and liquidity requirements (Basel III).23  How would these competing 
forces—competition and coordination—play out in the debate?  This 
was the overarching question the panelists addressed in the Symposium 
and in their articles. 
II. THEMES FROM THE SYMPOSIUM 
This collection of articles provides a rich and sophisticated 
commentary on international financial regulation that reflects diverse 
viewpoints, from which a number of intertwining themes emerge. 
First, never underestimate the importance of politics in the debate 
over regulatory reform.  In his study of U.S. regulation of foreign 
private issuers,24 Professor Steven M. Davidoff demonstrates that the 
administrative rulemaking process can be subject to the same political 
vicissitudes as the legislative process.  He provocatively argues that the 
rhetoric of “mutual recognition” and “global competition” was used to 
advance “a political economy and interest group story” for the benefit of 
key business constituencies.25  The result was deregulation in the name 
of competitiveness, with reduced concern for protecting retail investors 
and other domestic interests.  As a consequence, regulation of foreign 
private issuers is “one-size-fits-all” and fails to take into account the 
different risk profiles presented by Chinese issuers compared with 
European issuers.26  This is significant because in the past year there 
have been fourteen initial public offerings by foreign private issuers in 
the U.S., eleven of them from mainland China, none of them from 
Europe.27 
In his analysis of the contrasting approaches toward global 
convergence in accounting standards, Professor William W. Bratton also 
relates a narrative of interest group politics.28  GAAP, he tells us, “has 
come to be seen as one of the deadweight domestic regulatory costs that 
 22. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 23. Press Release, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Consultative Proposals to Strengthen 
the Resilience of the Banking Sector Announced by Basel Committee (Dec. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.bis.org/press/p091217.htm. 
 24. Davidoff, supra note 6. 
 25. Id. at 620. 
 26. Id. at 620, 645. 
 27. Id. at 643. 
 28. Bratton, supra note 7. 
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make U.S. capital markets unattractive to foreign issuers.”29  In 2008 the 
SEC, in what Professor Bratton describes as a “global panic attack,”30 
issued its Roadmap that sets forth a process that would lead to 
discarding GAAP for the use of IFRS by domestic issuers.  The SEC 
thus demonstrated its impatience with the slower, ongoing convergence 
project of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to develop 
compatible standards.  Professor Bratton first highlights some normative 
implications of a switch to IFRS and then develops the argument for the 
importance of an independent standard-setter.  Specifically, he argues 
that a switch to IFRS would give the preparers of financial statements 
(managers and auditors) the upper hand over the users of financial 
statements.31  FASB achieved public accountability and funding only 
after many years of hard work and only with SEC support; the IASB, in 
contrast, is dependent on private funding, principally from auditing 
firms, and has only recently set up a monitoring board.32  Professor 
Bratton argues that the financial crisis has changed the debate and that 
the Roadmap should be scrapped so that the more deliberative process of 
convergence can move forward.33 
Currently, the SEC is still scheduled to decide in 2011 whether IFRS 
would become exclusive, although SEC Chair Mary Schapiro has stated 
that the convergence projects currently underway between FASB and 
IASD must be completed before the decision can be made.34  The 
Chairman of the IFRS Advisory Council, however, recently stated that 
convergence with the FASB would no longer be its prime consideration 
and that it would instead focus on serving those who have adopted 
IFRS.35 
Second, never underestimate the power of global financial 
conglomerates.  Professor James A. Fanto explores whether the 
dismantling of global financial conglomerates may be warranted because 
of the economic and political threats they represent.36  From fall 2008 
 29. Id. at 491. 
 30. Id. at 497. 
 31. Id. at 474. 
 32. Id. at 486. 
 33. Id. at 496. 
 34. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Chairman: Statement 
at SEC Open Meeting – Global Accounting Standards (Feb. 24, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch022410mls-accounting.htm. 
 35. Denise Lugo, Accounting Principles: IFRS Chairman Says FASB Convergence Not Future 
Priority, May Approach Others, Sec. L. Daily (BNA), Oct. 6, 2010. 
 36. James A. Fanto, “Breaking Up is Hard To Do”: Should Financial Conglomerates Be 
Dismantled?, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 553 (2010). 
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until mid-2009, the consistent approach of both the Bush and Obama 
Administrations was to stabilize financial conglomerates, rework their 
capital support, and oversee their rehabilitation.37  As a result, the 
surviving conglomerates returned to profitability, executive 
compensation increased, and there was greater industry concentration.38  
In its second year, however, the Obama Administration put forth several 
proposals for breaking up conglomerates, including a tax aimed at large 
investment banking-dominated conglomerates, the “Volcker Rule” that 
would prohibit conglomerates from sponsoring hedge funds and 
engaging in proprietary trading, and size limits on regulated financial 
conglomerates.39  Professor Fanto first sets forth the problems caused by 
financial conglomerates during the financial crisis, often arising from 
their securities activities: systemic risk, risk management, 
commoditization and opaqueness of financial products, compensation 
policies, conflicts of interest, and government support and politics.  
After reviewing the arguments for and against break-up as well as 
alternative approaches, he concludes that while many of the problems 
presented by financial conglomerates argue for their break-up, strong 
political pressures and the orientation of international financial 
regulation mean that in all likelihood “conglomerates will endure,” even 
though they cannot be effectively risk-managed.40 
Indeed, although Congress proclaimed that Dodd–Frank put an end to 
“too big to fail,”41 in fact the legislation contemplates modest limitations 
on the size and riskiness of the global financial conglomerates.  The 
newly established Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) can 
identify “systemically important” companies and recommend heightened 
prudential standards,42 and systemically important companies will be 
subject to systemic regulation and other fees that might serve as a 
disincentive to large size.43  The “Volcker Rule” restricts banks from 
proprietary trading and limits private equity and hedge fund investments 
to three per cent of tier 1 capital, phased in over several years.44  Finally, 
the Federal Reserve (Fed) can, if it finds that a firm presents a “grave 
 37. Id. at 558–59. 
 38. Id. at 559. 
 39. Id. at 560–63. 
 40. Id. at 585. 
 41. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, & URBAN AFFAIRS, BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE 
DODD–FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1 (2010), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_sum
mary_Final.pdf. 
 42. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 115, 165, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 43. §§ 155(d), 318(c). 
 44. § 619. 
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threat to the financial stability of the United States,” require it to divest 
assets and activities.45  In addition, the Basel III standards impose 
stricter standards for capital, leverage, and liquidity.46  To date, 
however, the government’s emphasis on preventing “too big to fail” is 
not on reducing the size of firms.  Instead, regulators assert that, under 
the new regulatory system, firms will have to manage better their risk, 
and regulators will provide more effective supervision.  Furthermore, in 
the event of firm failure, regulators point to the provisions on orderly 
liquidation47 to contain the effects.  Thus, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke 
identified a three-part strategy to address “too big to fail”: (1) reduce 
excessive risk-taking; (2) implement orderly liquidation; and (3) 
increase resiliency of financial system.48  Yet the solution of an orderly 
liquidation process for global financial conglomerates is untested, and 
many doubt whether it will work to prevent future financial crises.49 
Third, while regulators espouse the importance of cooperation and 
coordination, much work needs to be done to overcome territoriality and 
competition.  Professor Chris Brummer provides a framework for 
viewing the role of national regulators as sources of international finance 
law.50  In particular, Professor Brummer examines the use of 
extraterritoriality as a regulatory strategy.  He argues that “territorial” 
authority in financial regulation “in practice constitutes a diverse array 
of tactics employed by national authorities to exert authority over mobile 
market participants.”51  Because globalization limits the effectiveness of 
territoriality as a regulatory technique, regulators increasingly emphasize 
the “softer” process of international cooperative efforts in information 
sharing and development of norms.52  He concludes, nonetheless, that 
territoriality remains a central element in international coordination, 
 45. § 121.  See Posting of Simon Johnson to The Baseline Scenario, http://baselinescenario.com/ 
2010/07/09/the-kanjorski-surprise-%e2%80%93-now-it-gets-interesting/ (July 9, 2010, 6:06 AM) 
(suggesting it could have a meaningful impact on banking industry). 
 46. Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision 
Announces Higher Global Minimum Capital Standards (Sept. 12, 2010), available at 
http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.htm. 
 47. Dodd–Frank Act §§ 201–217. 
 48. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Statement before the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (Sept. 2, 2010).  See also Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit 
Ins. Corp., Statement before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (Sept. 3, 2010) (in the event firms 
do not manage risks better, orderly liquidation will contain the problem). 
 49. See, e.g., James H.M. Sprayregen & Stephen E. Hessler, “Orderly Liquidation Authority” 
under the Dodd–Frank Act. INSOL WORLD, 3rd Quart. 2010, at 23, available at 
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/ARTICLES%20-%20PRINTING%20ALLOWED%20-
%20INSOL%20World%20-%20Sprayregen_Hessler.pdf. 
 50. Brummer,supra note 8. 
 51. Id. at 501. 
 52. Id. at 524. 
7
Black: INTRODUCTION: THE GLOBALIZATION OF SECURITIES REGULATION—COMPETIT
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
BLACK'S INTRO FINAL FORMAT (PAGINATED) 3/18/2011  1:23:04 PM 
468 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
even though unilateral, territorially-based regulatory export has become 
increasingly difficult.53 
Professor Robert B. Ahdieh and Andrea M. Corcoran, in turn, present 
complementary approaches to the importance of cooperation and 
information-sharing to prevent or remediate financial crises and address 
the limitations on effective cross-border regulation.  Professor Ahdieh 
focuses on the choice of institutional design as he explores what 
regulatory structures and institutions are likely to be the most effective 
in preventing and alleviating financial crises.54  He first sets forth an 
account of financial crises as grounded in the multiple equilibrium 
character of the financial markets and develops a framework of the 
critical determinants of salience—familiarity, visibility, uniqueness, and 
authority—that institutions should possess in order to coordinate market 
participants around the high-level equilibrium of lending, investment, 
and spending.  He next explores the role of transnational regulatory 
networks in the financial crisis and explains that constraints on 
institutional salience resulted in the networks’ limited role in the crisis.55  
Finally, he focuses on the restructuring of the FSB to illustrate certain 
inherent limits of networks and to suggest institutional reforms that 
might improve their effectiveness in financial crises. 
Andrea Corcoran examines the proposal by the FSB to require 
biennial peer reviews of the G-20 countries using existing key standards 
and codes in order to address a key issue: whether enforcement of 
existing global standards for capital markets, particularly those related to 
cooperative information exchange, can be expected to prevent or remedy 
a future financial crisis.56  She first examines the limitations in the 
existing IOSCO Standards, particularly gaps in addressing prudential 
risks and other systemic vulnerabilities and gaps in information sharing.  
Cooperative information-sharing, she points out, may not be 
forthcoming where insufficient funds are available to satisfy all  
claims.57  In addition, the standards do not adequately address the canon 
of country specificity and the problem of regulatory arbitrage.58  She 
then sets forth a number of proposed reforms in terms of both substance 
and procedure, while noting the inherent limits on information sharing 
 53. Id. 
 54. Ahdieh, supra note 14. 
 55. Id. at 546. 
 56. Andrea M. Corcoran, Globalization Report Cards for Securities Regulators: National 
Enforcement of International Capital Market Standards for Information Sharing and Cooperation and 
the Prevention of Financial Crises, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 651 (2010). 
 57. Id. at 664. 
 58. Id. at 666–68. 
8
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss2/1
BLACK'S INTRO FINAL FORMAT (PAGINATED) 3/18/2011  1:23:04 PM 
2010] INTRODUCTION 469 
 
and cooperation. 
Fourth, harmonization and centralization are worthy goals to strive 
for, even if far off.  Dodd–Frank underscores the importance of 
international policy coordination.  The statute authorizes the President to 
coordinate through international policy channels policies to limit the 
“scope, nature, size, scale, concentration, and interconnectedness” of 
financial conglomerates.59  It also mandates the FSOC to consult with its 
counterparts and international organizations on “matters relating to 
systemic risk to the international financial system”60 and the Federal 
Reserve Board to consult with its counterparts and appropriate 
multilateral organizations “to encourage comprehensive and robust 
prudential supervision and regulation for all highly leveraged and 
interconnected financial companies.”61  Nevertheless, the current system 
of international securities regulation is essentially based on a model of 
regulatory competition as nations attempt to attract issuers, investors, 
and other market participants to their shores.  Professor Eric C. Chaffee 
argues that the current system fostered a “race-to-the-bottom” that 
culminated in the lax regulation at the heart of the financial crisis.62  
Professor Chaffee articulates a bold alternative vision—a centralized 
global securities regulator with monitoring, regulating, and enforcement 
powers that would set a baseline of regulation from which nations could 
choose to depart upwardly.  Professor Chaffee argues that this model 
would minimize systemic risks, benefit market participants, and allow 
the U.S. to retain a central role.63  He then outlines an evolutionary 
process through two case studies of long-term evolutionary institution 
building, the development of securities regulation in the U.S., and the 
development of securities regulation in the European Union.  The 
common characteristics of the two case studies, he argues, “include 
evolution based on political stress, evolution based on the failure of 
institutions to achieve their intended goals, and a consistent trajectory 
toward harmonization and centralization.”64 
III. CONCLUSION 
In the post-financial crisis era, there is consensus that the 
 59. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 175(a), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 60. § 175(b). 
 61. § 175(c). 
 62. Eric C. Chaffee, Contemplating the Endgame: An Evolutionary Model for the Harmonization 
and Centralization of International Securities Regulation, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 587, 588 (2010). 
 63. Id. at 601. 
 64. Id. at 612–13. 
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interconnectedness of financial markets requires a global approach to 
securities regulation.  Expressions about the importance of cooperation 
and coordination, however, mask strong underlying sentiments based on 
politics and territorial competition.  The hard work is ahead, as 
policymakers and regulators move from the abstract to the concrete.  It 
remains very much to be seen how these countervailing forces will play 
out in the implementation of Dodd–Frank and international regulatory 
efforts.  Stay tuned for the 2012 Symposium, which will address the 
implementation of Dodd–Frank. 
10
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss2/1
